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Introduction 
Ever since the ‘ethnic explosion’1 and secessionism blasted across the world in the mid-1980s, 
theorists have worked overtime to devise solutions to what appears to be an intractable problem. 
The problem is simply this: how can the escalation of ethnic discontent into violence, armed 
struggle and demands for separation be pre-empted? Violent conflicts can be managed, but when 
politics in the violent mode overlaps with identity issues, the problem verges on the  insoluble. 
However, ethnic wars have to be forestalled, simply because they have inflicted incalculable 
harm on the human condition - grave and massive violations of human rights, dislocations, 
homelessness, desecration, ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
 
Basically, three solutions are on offer to resolve the problem: institutionalisation of democracy; 
federalism or decentralisation of power and resources;2  and minority rights. Democracy assures 
citizens that their fundamental rights will be protected through the institutionalisation of two 
basic norms - participation and accountability. Federalism in and for plural societies is not only 
about decentralisation of power and resources to territorially distinct administrative units, it is 
also about such decentralisation to the dominant ethnic group which inhabits these territories, so 
that the group acquires a stake in the system. Democracy and federalism must be backed by  the 
constitutional sanction of minority rights in order to prove effective. 
 
This formulation is by no means uncontroversial.3 Studies of the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union and erstwhile Yugoslavia suggest that control over local institutions supplies  political 
elites with the political and economic resources to undertake mass mobilisation and wage 
separatist struggles. Bunce, for instance, argues that the communist federations ‘put into place 
virtually all the building blocks that are necessary for the rise of nationalist movements and for 
the formation of states’.4 These federations recognised and promoted a common language, 
                                                 
1 The term ethnicity is employed as shorthand for linguistic, religious, and tribal identities, this is not to say that each 
of these identities are not specific. 
2 The classic statement on political decentralisation has been made by Arendt Lipjhart, 1977, Democracy in Plural 
Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press,  also Chaim Kaufman, 1996, 
‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, 20, 4, 133-175, Donald Horowitz, 
1991, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, Berkeley,  University of 
California Press, and Eric Nordlinger, 1972, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press. 
3 For an overview of relevant literature see Ian S. Lustick, Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson, 2004,  
‘Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?’ 
American Political Science Review, 98, 2, May, pp 209-229. 
4  Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism 
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created a sub-intelligentsia, trained and funded sub-national political elites, and provided the 
resources which sub-elites could use for legitimation.5  On balance, however, the federal 
argument is preferred to the one that opposes federal arrangements. ‘Whereas decentralisation 
may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective action…’ writes 
Hechter, ‘at the same time it may erode the demand for sovereignty’.6 
 
The problem is that the establishment of democracy, federalism, and minority rights in India7 has 
not precluded violent politics, armed rebellion, and secessionism in Punjab, Mizoram, Jammu 
and Kashmir (J and K), and Manipur. Today, Punjab and Mizoram are post-conflict societies but 
until  the late 1980s these two states were wracked by tremendous violence and demands for 
secession.  The other two states continue to be torn apart by the same phenomenon. Something 
has gone seriously wrong with the performance of democratic and federal institutions in this part 
of the country and it is the task of a responsible political theorist to see what has gone wrong and 
where. As Dunn sagely reminds us ‘the purpose of political theory is to diagnose political 
predicaments and to show us how best to confront them.’8 
  
 
Some Research Findings 
 
The research team carried out surveys in the highest conflict district in each of the four states. 
Within the highest conflict district we carried out surveys in two sets of villages: high conflict 
areas [HCA] and low conflict areas [LCA]. A total of 1,298 surveys were conducted over  the 
four states. The sample size is admittedly small and inadequate if the objective is to present  work 
which is data-based and data-driven. However, the survey does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive  base for explanation, nor was it meant to do so. The objective of the survey in the 
highest conflict areas of the four states  was to capture resonances of voices ‘from below’, as 
distinct from the voices of either militant leaderships or that of the government, both of which 
claim to represent the inhabitants of conflict areas. I am more than aware that ‘voices from 
below’ are not only constituted by the experiential but also by the expressive, or by the way the 
problem has been articulated by the media, scholars, militant leaders and the government. In 
these days of transnational information flows, we can hardly attach authenticity to what we term 
‘voices from below’, or regard these voices as a purely unmediated phenomenon. However, what 
can be done is to see these voices as a referral for an explanation that builds an argument on and 
around them.  
For instance, secessionist demands in all four states can be easily and perhaps conveniently 
interpreted in terms of ethnic/religious identity. After all, erstwhile militants in Punjab fought - 
                                                                                                                                                              
and the State, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 49. 
 
5 Valerie Bunce, 2004, ‘Federalism, Nationalism, and Secession: The Communist and Postcommunist Experience’ in 
Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, ed Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, p 
49 
6 Michael Hechter, 2000, Containing Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,  p 146 
7 In India, the formation of constituent states of the federation was based on the principle of language in the first 
round, and the principle of ethnicity combined with regional backwardness in the second and third rounds. Protective 
discrimination is extended to Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and minorities are assured of the right to their religion, 
culture, script, and the right to set up their own educational institutions, via articles 25 to 30 in the Constitution, with 
article 29 and 30 providing specific instances of minority rights.  
8 John Dunn, 1990, Interpreting Political Responsibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
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and today’s militants in the Kashmir valley fight - in the cause of a religion that differs from the 
dominant religion in India which is Hinduism. The Mizo community is Christian. Radical 
sections of the Meitei community in Manipur increasingly reject Hinduism and opt for their 
traditional Sanamahi religion. Yet a larger percentage of  respondents who said that democracy 
and accountability of institutions is the most important thing for them, think that identity is the 
cause of the conflict, compared to  those who opted for independence/secession as the most 
important (table 1).  Secondly, neglect of identity does not come across as a significant reason for 
blaming a particular agency or institution for conflict. Only 2.9 percent of those who think that 
political parties are one of the biggest factors for the outbreak of conflict think this is so because 
parties ignore identity issues and 6.5 percent of those who said that respective state governments 
are the biggest factor for the eruption of conflict, think this is so because the institution has 
ignored identity. A further 14 percent of respondents believe that the central government is 
responsible for the conflict because it has ignored identity issues. In the category of those who 
think that meeting basic needs is most important, 10 percent feel that the central government has 
ignored identity issues, and roughly  23 percent of those who want to secede from India want to 
do so because the central government has ignored identity issues. It should be noted that above 
all,  respondents are equally divided on the issue, since an equal proportion of respondents (39 
percent) think that identity is, or is not, a reason for conflict. This trend is also seen in the case of 
those who want independence from India - 45 percent think identity is a reason for conflict and 
47 percent do not. In short, those who hold political institutions responsible for the conflict, 
because these institutions ignore identity issues, are generally those who desire independence, as 
well as those who expect greater accountability from institutions. 
  
Table 1: Distribution of Identity as a reason for conflict across what is most important for 
the respondent 
 
What is most important to you? Identity a 
reason for 
Conflict Independenc
e from India 
Accountability 
of Institutions 
Functioning 
Democracy 
Meeting 
Basic Needs 
Others DK/ 
NR 
Missing      
Total 
Yes 45.9 55.6 53.0 30.9 29.3 30.6 41.7 39.2 
No 47.2 37.8 35.4 36.6 56.0 27.8 16.7 39.8 
DK/NR 5.6 5.9 9.9 31.3 13.8 38.9 16.7 19.6 
Missing 1.3 0.7 1.7 1.2 0.9 2.8 25.0 1.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No. of 
Observations 
233 135 181 585 116 36 12 1,298 
 
 
This is not to say that identity is not important for most people most of the time. Compared to the 
27 percent of  respondents for whom independence is most important, 38 percent of those 
respondents for whom a functioning democracy is most important see identity as very important. 
Furthermore, whereas only 18 percent of our potential secessionists see identity as important, 
almost 30 percent of those respondents for whom institutional accountability is most important 
see identity as important. The fact that identity is important for people across the board is further 
borne out by the finding that a greater percentage of respondents who felt that meeting basic 
needs was most important for them, visit religious places more often than those who want to 
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separate from India.9  In effect, more people who do not subscribe to secessionism view identity 
as very important or as important compared to those who do subscribe to it (table 2). 
  
Table 2: Distribution of the importance of identity across what is most important for the 
respondent, (answers for all tables in percentages) 
 
What is most important to you?                                      
Identity 
Independence 
from India 
Accountability 
of Institutions 
Functioning 
Democracy 
Meeting 
Basic Needs 
 
Others 
 
DK/NR 
 
Missing 
     
Total 
V. Important 27.0 23.0 38.1 14.4 14.7 11.1 41.7  21.0 
Important 18.0 29.6 11.0 16.6 14.7 19.4 0.0 17.2 
Negligible 0.4 1.5 1.7 0.5 0.9 2.8 0.0 0.8 
Not Imp. 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 
DK/NR 1.3 1.5 3.3 2.4 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.0 
Missing 52.8 44.4 44.8 66.2 69.0 63.9 58.3 58.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No. of Observations 233 135 181 585 116 36 12 1,298 
 
 
We can accept that identities are important for people across the board; perhaps it gives us a 
metaphorical address in an otherwise homeless world. However, a political analyst is more 
interested in another question - how and why do identities come to be politicised and harnessed to 
particular projects, e.g. secessionism, in the first place? The case of Mizoram is exceptional; the 
ethnic factor plays a negligible role here, because Mizo society is more or less mono-religious 
and therefore less susceptible to the kind of politicisation, fractionalisation and polarisation that 
we have seen in, for example, Manipur. But in the other three states, identities have been 
politicised to a large extent, even if identity anxieties may not be a proximate cause for conflict. 
 
The first proposition of this essay accordingly is this:  we need to look beyond the enactment of 
what are euphemistically termed identity wars to see what led to the politicisation of identities in 
the first place.  
 
The second proposition is the following: identities are politicised and harnessed to projects of 
violent resistance/secessionism when political agreements are violated, when institutions default 
on the promises that underpin the institutionalisation of norms - that politics will be conducted 
according to rules and not according to arbitrary and whimsical personalised regimes - and when 
popular expectations of institutions remain unfulfilled. For instance, if we look at the statistical 
profile of our potential secessionists, out of the 18 percent of our total respondents for whom 
independence/secession is most important, 51 percent feel that basic needs are a problem. 
Surprisingly, 24 percent of those who want independence believe that democracy has functioned 
well, but 60 percent in the same category are not satisfied with the functioning of the democratic 
system in India. On the other hand an equal number of respondents are of the opinion that neglect 
                                                 
9 45 percent of our respondents who identified basic needs as most important- as opposed to independence, 
democracy and institutional accountability- visit religious places more than once in a week. Comparably, only 17.5 
percent of those for whom independence is most important go to their religious places that often. 
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of identity is, or is not, a cause for conflict. Clearly the so-called ‘ethnic wars’ appear to be wars 
not only over identity anxieties but over other things as well. 
 
More importantly, 50 percent (or 650 out of a total of 1,298 respondents) are of the opinion that 
three political institutions - political parties, the state government and the central government - 
are the biggest factors for the outbreak of conflict. In this category 17 percent believe that 
political parties are the biggest factor, while figures for the state and central government stand at 
14.7 percent and 15.1 percent respectively. If we combine these figures with the answers of those 
respondents who hold that these three institutions are an important reason for conflict, the 
numbers add up to a staggering total. About 70 percent of our total respondents have identified 
three political institutions as either the biggest or an important factor for the outbreak of conflict 
(Table 3).  
 
Table 3 Distribution of biggest or important factor for the three political institutions 
(answers in percentages) 
    
Political Institutions Numbers Percent 
Biggest Factor     
Political Party 221 17.03 
State Government 192 14.79 
Central Government 196 15.1 
Important Factor     
Political Party 92 7.09 
State Government 131 10.09 
Central Government 86 6.63 
Others 
380 29.28 
Total 1,298 100 
 
 
Why do respondents consider political institutions responsible for the outbreak of conflict? About 
50 percent of respondents hold political institutions responsible for the conflict because they are 
corrupt; 60 percent of those who feel that political parties are the biggest reason for conflict 
consider this is so because parties are corrupt and about 40 percent of those respondents who hold 
the state government as the biggest factor for conflict said this was so because state governments 
are corrupt. In the category of those for whom accountability of institutions is important, a 
significant proportion of people have expressed the opinion that political institutions are corrupt. 
Notably, for those respondents who desire independence from India, corruption in political 
parties and in the state government is one of the main reasons for conflict.  Among those for 
whom a functioning democracy is important, 22 percent feel that the central government is 
corrupt and 11 percent of those who want to secede from India also feel the same. The second 
largest percentage of respondents (39) who believe  that political institutions are responsible for 
the conflict feel that this is so because they ignore basic needs, and about 20 percent of this 
number hold the state government responsible for the same. This finding with regard to  basic 
needs is reinforced when we look at the responses to the question of what is important to the 
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respondent: independence, democracy, accountability or governance, and basic needs. The survey 
shows that 18.1 percent of respondents are of the opinion that independence is most important for 
them,10 10.5 percent feel that accountability is most important for them, 14.1 percent responded 
that democracy is most important for them, and as many as 45.5 percent are of the opinion that 
meeting basic needs is most important for them. As mentioned above, a relatively small number 
of respondents said that political institutions are responsible for the outbreak of conflict because 
they neglect identity. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of the reasons for conflict across political institutions 
 
Political 
Institutions 
Corrupt Ignore basic 
needs 
Ignore 
identity 
Others DK/NR Missing Total 
Political 
Parties 
23.0 10.2 2.9 3.0 1.2 59.7 100 
State 
Government 
18.3 20.9 6.5 2.9 0.8 50.5 100 
Central 
Government 
8.2 8.5  13.9 15.0 0.8 53.6 100 
 
 
 
The third proposition is that none of the three factors identified by the respondents as reasons for 
the outbreak of conflict i.e. corruption (the political factor), neglect of basic needs (the economic 
factor) and neglect of identity (the ethnic factor), stand alone. In all four cases, conflict has 
resulted from the intersection of at least two out of the three factors identified above. In Punjab if 
the denial of a linguistic state (the ethnic factor) catalysed mobilisation by the Akali Dal (AD), 
over time this initial resentment was compounded by the violation of the federal principle of 
regional autonomy by the central government (the political factor). In J and K, if a major breach 
of the terms on which the state acceded to India created anger, this was intensified when 
democracy was not given a chance to work in the state, again through violations of the principle 
of regional autonomy (political factors). The fact that the majority of inhabitants in the valley are 
Muslim, the majority of the inhabitants in Jammu - except in a few pockets - are Hindu and Sikh 
and the majority of the inhabitants in Ladakh are Buddhist, has served to sharpen the ethnic edge 
of politics and policies (the ethnic factor). Conflict in Manipur is  the outcome of a major overlap 
between the political and the ethnic factor, whilst in Mizoram economic factors have intertwined 
with political ones to create armed violence.  
 
Two issues need to be clarified before proceeding to elaborate these propositions. Firstly,  we 
need to see what implications the employment of the term ‘corruption’ holds for the performance 
of political institutions. At one level, corruption is a descriptive term indicating misuse of public 
office for private gain. But at a deeper level corruption is a pejorative, and for that reason an 
                                                 
10 As expected, those respondents  who said that independence is most important for them are concentrated in 
conflict areas. 30 percent of our respondents in high conflict areas (HCAs) and 33 percent in low conflict areas 
(LCAs) in the Kashmir valley replied that independence is most important. In Manipur 39 percent in HCAs and 28 
percent in LCAs said that independence is most important for them. In Boras, which is a LCA in Kashmir, 42.5 
percent of the respondents saw independence as most important, but 31.3 percent also saw basic needs as most 
important. Similarly in Lamlai which is a HCA, 39 percent opted for independence as most important for them, but 
20.8 said basic needs are most important for them. The respondents who did not see independence as important are 
predictably from the two post-conflict states of Punjab and Mizoram.     
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evaluative, term. Whereas corruption implies lack of probity, it also implies that the abuse of 
public office for private gain has led to mis-governance and a resultant loss of confidence in the 
capacity of institutions to regulate collective life. This is evident when we look at the linguistic 
and cultural connotations of corruption. In Punjab the word bhrashtachar indicates violation of 
codes of propriety. In the Mizo language the synonym for corruption carries strong moral 
overtones. Eirukna  means misappropriation of public funds and Hlemhletna (lemletna) means 
general misconduct of both private and public affairs. In specifically political terms, these words 
indicate an increasing crisis of governance caused largely by unaccountability. The Kashmiri 
synonym for corruption- Khunz - stands for moral and political corruption in both private and 
public spheres. In Manipuri/ Meitei language, corruption is synonymous with Senja-Thumja  or a 
non-performing government and a materially corrupt system.  
To sum up, whereas the term corruption was interpreted as misconduct in both personal and 
public spheres, in the specific context of the question:  ‘why are political institutions the most 
important factor for the outbreak of conflict?’, corruption can legitimately be interpreted to mean 
(a) appropriation of public office for personal ends, (b) mis-governance resulting in 
malfunctioning of political institutions and (c) loss of confidence in the capacity of institutions to 
govern according to rules.  
Arguably, loss of confidence in public institutions carries far-reaching implications. For one, 
institutions embody a commitment that political or collective life will be conducted according to 
norms.11 The legitimacy of institutions is predicated upon this, on the assumption that collective 
life will not prove chancy, contingent, or capricious. This is the classical Hobbesian resolution to 
the problem of contingency: human beings will give up everything except their right to self-
preservation, provided the sovereign lends predictability to individual and collective life. The 
moment he stops doing so, the contract is dissolved. In the same way, institutions engender 
expectations that the activity we call politics will be governed by rules. But when the rules that 
govern relations between citizens and the state (democracy) or between different units of the state 
(federalism) are dishonoured or broken, citizens lose confidence in the ability of institutions to 
regulate collective life according to embedded norms. The use of the term corruption, which 
emerges as the single largest cause of conflict (re. political institutions), captures precisely this 
aspect of institutional performance in the four states.  
It does not require a gigantic leap of the imagination to assume that when citizens lose confidence 
in institutions, they are compelled to resort to violence outside the sphere of formal politics, or in 
an extra-institutional space. Or because the political domain has been debilitated by the 
malfunctioning of institutions, politics spills out of institutional channels into the streets, the 
forests, and the hills. In other words, conflict occurs when the ability of political institutions to 
contain demands is incapacitated by the misuse of public office for private gain. This leads to 
mis-governance on the one hand and to lack  of confidence on the other; processes which breed 
the expected results. The strong  response to the issue of corruption by the people we surveyed 
seems to carry serious implications for the performance of political institutions. 
The second issue is this: there is no necessary relationship between democracy and federalism. 
But if we assume that democracy rests on the normative precepts of participation and 
accountability, then federalism best serves to realise these precepts. Both institutions realise 
                                                 
11 Political institutions need not be norm based; they may well rest on pragmatic considerations. However, 
democratic institutions should logically embody the norms of democracy. 
 8
popular sovereignty, which is the linchpin of modern democracies. It is this  assumption that 
governed the adoption of both democracy and federalism in India. Therefore, when the federal 
principle is violated - for instance when regional autonomy is infringed by the central 
government - the democratic principles of participation and accountability are also violated.  
      
Accounting for Conflict 
 
Let me reiterate the three propositions made above.  Firstly, we need to look beyond the 
enactment of what are euphemistically termed identity wars and see what led to the politicisation 
of identities in the first place. Secondly, identities are politicised and harnessed to projects of 
violent resistance when political agreements are violated, when institutions default on the 
promises that underpin the institutionalisation of norms - that politics will be conducted 
according to rules and not according to arbitrary and whimsical personalized regimes - and when 
popular expectations of institutions are belied. Thirdly, none of the three factors identified by the 
respondents as reasons for the outbreak of conflict stand alone or by themselves. In all four cases, 
conflict has resulted from the intersection of at least two out of these three factors. However, I 
shall argue that one factor has proved decisive in the outbreak of conflict - the performance of 
political institutions, or the lack thereof.12 I shall also argue that the decentralisation of power to 
dominant ethnic groups within the constituent states of the Indian Federation has actually resulted 
in the mobilisation of ethnicity. It is when violations of the federal/democratic principle combine 
with the politicisation of ethnicity, that conflicts become intractable. 
 
This is not to say that basic needs are not significant. Whatever reasons different people have for 
pursuing their own projects, all of them have an essential interest in having their basic needs met. 
In other words,  basic needs have to be met in order to allow people to do anything else. This is 
clear when the responses to two questions in our survey, (a) ‘what is most important to you?’ and 
(b) ‘what do you identify as the biggest problem?’ are correlated (table 5) 
                                                 
12 Notably these three institutions-the central government, the state governments, and national and regional political 
parties - are a constitutive part of federalism in the country. Whereas power and resources are constitutionally 
divided between the central and the state governments, national and regional political parties simply make the system 
work. 
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Table 5: Percentage distribution of biggest problem identified across ‘what is most 
important to you?’ 
What is most Important to You? Biggest 
Problem 
Independence 
from India 
Accountability 
of Institutions 
Functioning 
Democracy 
Meeting 
Basic Needs 
Others DK/ 
NR 
Missing Total 
Basic Needs 51.1 
 
45.9 53.6 68.5 33.6 55.6 50.0 57.3 
Security 10.7 12.6 4.4 1.9 4.3 11.1 0.0 5.4 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
1.3 0.0 2.8 1.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.7 
Agricultural Inputs 0.0 0.7 2.2 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Agricultural Prices 0.4 1.5 1.1 1.4 3.4 0.0 8.3 1.4 
Unemployment 16.3 
 
16.3 16.6 11.1 23.3 2.8 16.7 14.3 
Governance 5.2 
 
5.2 4.4 0.5 0.9 2.8 8.3 2.5 
Issues Raised by 
Actors of Conflict 
6.4 4.4 3.9 1.2 3.4 5.6 0.0 3.2 
Others 0.0 
 
0.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Missing 8.6 
 
12.6 10.5 12.3 26.7 22.2 16.7 13.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The finding that the neglect of basic needs is a reason for conflict in the four states makes sense 
when we recollect that all four states are predominantly agricultural economies with a large 
proportion of their citizens engaged in cultivation. Over the years agriculture has shown a 
consistent decline all over the country and the case of the four states is no different. For instance, 
in the mid 1960s the agricultural sector in Punjab was transformed by the introduction of Green 
Revolution technologies. Consequently the state emerged as the granary of India and led the 
country in terms of per-capita income until the end of the 1990s. Although the uneven effects of 
the agrarian revolution bred a class of dispossessed farmers and marginal peasants, Punjab has 
simply not experienced the kind of poverty we find in other states. More importantly, we cannot 
discover a negative correlation between militancy and agricultural performance during the 
highest phase of militancy from 1980 to 1992.13 Amritsar and Gurdaspur in the Majha region, 
Ludhiana in the Malwa region, and Jullunder in the Doaba region, all of which were high conflict 
areas, actually performed better than low conflict areas. Therefore, there is little evidence that 
lack of economic opportunities was a direct reason for the outbreak of militancy. It was only in 
the 1990s that the Green Revolution ran out of steam. This was compounded by increased costs 
of production, stagnating returns, over-exploitation of natural resources, declining public and 
private sector investments, inadequate marketing and pricing mechanisms, insufficient processing 
of vegetables, fruits and other crops, dwindling research and extension inputs, low investment 
flows in agro-processing industries, and above all the withdrawal of the state from the supportive 
role that it played till the late 1980s. By 1998, 20 percent of the farming population - 24 percent 
of small farmers and 31 percent of marginal farmers - were below the poverty line.14 In short, 
                                                 
13 Militancy adversely affected both the real estate and the service sector to some extent. 
14 See Ramesh Chand, 1999, “Emerging Crisis in Punjab Agriculture: Severity and Options for Future” Economic 
and Political Weekly. Special Issue on Agriculture, March 27, pp A7-A10 in pg A3.  
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basic needs may be a problem today because of the crisis in Punjab agriculture. But Punjab is still 
way ahead of the other three states when it comes to economic opportunities.15 It ranks low on 
the scale of poverty in the country, and the rate of unemployment which increased from 3.08 
percent during 1993-94 to 4.15 percent on current daily statuses during 1999-2000, with urban 
unemployment among the educated youth higher than rural unemployment, is not high compared 
to the rest of the country.   
 
J and K is a success story for another reason: the radical transformation of property relations via 
an ambitious programme of land reforms, which were initiated by Sheikh Abdullah from 1948 
onwards. Land reforms were crucial since 80 percent of the population is engaged in agricultural 
activity. However, whereas increases in small holdings created a greater sense of equity, they also 
resulted in extreme fragmentation and parcelisation of land, with the average farm size (0.9 
hectare) considerably below the size required for optimal farming. Small land holdings are 
negatively correlated with productivity because these do not benefit from modern techniques of 
production. Although by the mid 1960s financial assistance from the central government and 
institutional innovations led to high yields, cropping patterns, lack of irrigation, power shortages, 
climatic difficulties, and the low size of landholdings have resulted in a deficit of food grains. 
The state has to import grain, milk, mutton, cereals, vegetables and wool from neighbouring 
states. Low performance in agriculture and allied sectors has resulted in about 35 percent of the 
inhabitants being unemployed.16 Moreover, the state ranks low on human development 
indicators, particularly literacy.  
 
Whereas Mizoram and Manipur rank high on human development indicators, both states have 
witnessed over the years stagnation in agriculture and rising unemployment. As part of the 
Northeast, Mizoram and Manipur fall within the genus of ‘special category’ states, directly 
receiving funds from the Central Government for development. In sharp contrast to the rest of the 
country, 90 percent of these funds are allocations and only 10 percent are treated as loans. Yet 
both states are economically backward. As a district of Assam, Mizoram received few benefits in 
terms of resources or investment and whatever resources were invested in the state went into 
agriculture and not into ameliorating the inadequate infrastructure. Matters did not improve after 
Mizoram was accorded the status of a Union Territory and then statehood. Until 1971 more than 
83 percent of the work force was involved in agriculture, mainly shifting cultivation, and the 
figure came down to 61 percent only by 1991. The Third Five Year Plan introduced a special 
development plan for the state in 1963-64, but the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1996 
hampered development. For one, during the course of the militancy about 20,000 families were 
displaced and resettled in new villages for security reasons. This undercut the system of land 
holdings and affected production of food grains. Since then the state has imported food from the 
rest of the country. Mizoram is one of the most economically underdeveloped states in the 
country. Only 17.44 percent of the net cultivated area is irrigated, per capita power consumption 
is far below national figures, and per capita incomes are much below the national average. Above 
all, unemployment is a serious problem with 400,000  youth seeking jobs.  
 
                                                 
15 But only Goa and J and K have poverty levels lower than Punjab. 
16 State Development Report: Jammu and Kashmir, 2004, Delhi, Planning Commission, Government of India, pg 
xxvi. 
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In Manipur, agriculture and allied activities are  the mainstay of the economy in both the hills and 
the valley. The Fifth Five Year Plan which focussed on the development of irrigation, power and 
infrastructure boosted agricultural growth in the state. But from the late 1970s food production in 
the state has been badly affected by successive droughts and floods on the one hand, and by a 
volatile political situation on the other. This has led to negative or low growth in food grain 
production from the 1970s onwards. Decline in agriculture has resulted in a major problem of 
unemployment, compounded by seasonal unemployment and under-employment in rural areas. 
Whereas more than 200,000 people were registered on the live register of the employment 
exchange in 1993, the number went up to more than 300,000  in 2000.17  Per capita income in the 
state is well below the national average and 40 percent of rural people in the state are below the 
poverty line compared to the 27 percent national average.  
 
It is clear that agricultural decline in all four states has led to serious unemployment, which is 
compounded by the fact that all four states have weak industrial economies. Since all four are 
border states, the central government has not invested in heavy industry for security reasons, and 
private entrepreneurs have shied away because of political instability. Punjab, which inherited a 
weak industrial base in 1947, is dominated by small scale industries which do not generate 
commensurate  employment. In J and K, poor infrastructure and an adverse investment climate 
have left the industrial sector in its infancy.  Medium scale industries operating under the public 
sector have performed badly, as a result of which under-employment and unemployment have 
grown into serious problems. The growth in job opportunities has simply not kept pace with 
population growth. In Mizoram and Manipur an underdeveloped infrastructure and lack of 
investment in power, irrigation, communications and transport, has discouraged the establishment 
of industries which could provide employment.  
 
Therefore, our respondents in the four states correctly perceive that basic needs are a problem, 
and that political institutions are guilty on this score. After all, democratic practices have 
established by now that it is the state that is responsible for meeting basic needs either through 
enhancing the buying capacities of the poor, or by providing goods to the poorer sections of 
society on the non-market principle. But whether non-access to basic needs leads directly to 
conflict is debatable; the case of Punjab disproves such assumptions. On the other hand economic 
underdevelopment and neglect of basic needs was an important cause of disaffection in Mizoram. 
However, discontent escalated into violence only when the  government of India refused the 
Mizo people their own state within the federation. It seems that the dynamics of poverty, 
unemployment and neglect of basic needs matter more when they overlap with the political 
dimensions of conflict.  Therefore, even if we take neglect of basic needs as a given in our case 
studies, we have to venture beyond the economic factor and into the domain of the political to 
search for the causes of conflict. Towards this end I seek to make two interlocking arguments. 
Firstly, when the working of federalism and democracy disprove the very assumptions upon 
which  these two institutions are founded, namely participation and accountability, some amount 
of discontent can be expected. Secondly the federal principle in India has led to the politicisation 
of identities simply because a determinate identity helps groups to claim the goods that are due to 
them as a collective entitlement. It is when the ethnic factor supervenes onto the political factor 
that conflicts become intractable.  
                                                 
17 S. Brajamani, 2003, Economic Growth in Manipur: An Empirical Analysis, Imphal, S. Romesh Singh, pg 73 
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The Making of the Federation 
 
Let me begin this section of the argument by suggesting that in all four states the founding 
moment of violence can be traced to the founding moment of the Indian Federation.  The cases of 
J and K and Manipur rank rather high on this scale.18  J and K and Manipur were princely states 
that lay outside the ambit of what was known as British India. The relationship of the 700 or so 
princely states to the colonial government was regulated through a series of agreements which 
gave the latter a great deal of political clout in these territories. However, the impending 
independence of India transformed the political scene dramatically. On 12 May 1946 the Cabinet 
Mission suggested that when India achieved independence, British paramountcy  over princely 
states would lapse. Therefore it was desirable that rulers should negotiate terms with successor 
governments. The Partition Plan of June 3 1947 precipitated matters, and the Governor General 
Lord Mountbatten set up two state departments to tackle the issue. According to a formula 
devised by Sardar Patel, those princely states that wished to accede to India would cede control 
over certain subjects to the Indian government. In other matters, pledged Patel, the government of 
India would scrupulously respect the power of the rulers.  
 
In late July 1947, Lord Mountbatten summoned a conference of rulers and persuaded some of 
them to sign the Instrument of Accession. Some rulers acceded readily, others bargained with 
both the successor states. In some states their peoples’ movement for responsible government 
decided which way to go, and in other rulers proved recalcitrant. The Indian National Congress at 
its session on 15 August 1947 resolved that the right of any princely state to declare 
independence was not acceptable. Pandit Nehru, slated to be the first Prime Minister of the 
Country, had already declared in April 1947 that states which refused to join the Constituent 
Assembly would be treated as hostile.19 
 
After the promulgation of the Indian Independence Act 1947 the princely states became 
technically independent. Most rulers with the exception of the rulers of Junagadh, Kashmir and 
Hyderabad had signed the Instrument of Accession and given up their control over defence, 
external affairs, and communications in exchange for privy purses.20 The ruler of J and K, 
deciding to keep his options open, proposed a 'Standstill Agreement’ with both India and 
Pakistan on 15 August,21 though he did consider the option of joining Pakistan if that would leave 
his powers and privileges intact.22 Internal developments in the state accelerated the resolution of 
the issue. In August 1947, the Muslim community of Poonch, provoked by the misrule of the 
Maharaja and by reports of massacres of Muslims in Hindu dominated eastern Jammu districts 
during the Partition, revolted under the leadership of demobilised soldiers. By 3 October the 
                                                 
18 The case of Punjab is discussed below under the heading of ethnic mapping 
19 This was at the Gwalior session of the All India State Peoples Conference. 
20 Though the Constitution allowed for the administrative status for some former princely states to contine, in time 
the status and the identities of princely states lapsed. 
 
21 A standstill agreement vide the Government of India Act 1935 ensured the continuation of essential relations in 
communication, trade, and posts between a princely state that had not decided upon its options and one or both 
dominions. 
22 At the time of partition of India J and K including Aksai Chin stretched over an area of 222,236 square kilometers; 
the valley constituted 10 percent of the total area, Jammu 14.4 percent, and the frontier districts as much as 75.6 
percent.   
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rebels who had acquired control over much of Poonch, along with the pro-Pakistani chieftains of 
Muzzafarabad and Mirpur in Western Jammu district, proclaimed the formation of ‘azad 
Kashmir’ in Pakistan. Shortly afterwards Gilghit and neighbouring states including Hunza and 
Nagar signed Instruments of Accession with Pakistan on 18 November 1947.23 Matters worsened 
when on 21 October 1947, Pakistan backed an armed incursion into the state by some several 
thousand Pashtun tribals from the North West Frontier Province. After taking the town of 
Muzaffarabad, the raiders headed for Baramulla and moved on towards Srinagar, inflicting 
terrible atrocities on the population and killing almost 3,000 of the 14,000 population of 
Baramulla.  
 
The Maharaja, who sought India’s assistance to repel the invaders and restore order in the state, 
signed the Instrument of Accession with India on 26 October 1947.24 Lord Mountbatten, the 
Governor General of India, accepted it the next day. But there is a twist in the tale, a twist which 
still haunts politics in the Kashmir valley today. In the letter that accompanied the acceptance of 
the Instrument of Accession, Lord Mountbatten stipulated that after the invasion had been dealt 
with and law and order restored, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a 
plebiscite. This was consistent, wrote Mountbatten, with the policy of the Government of India: 
in any state where accession was disputed, the matter should be decided in accordance with the 
wishes of the people. 
 
The plebiscite could not be held since (a) the invasions continued even though they had been 
contained by the Indian army and (b) India and Pakistan went to war over Jammu and Kashmir in 
April 1948. In January 1948, India lodged a formal complaint against Pakistani aggression in the 
Security Council and the issue was internationalised. The Security Council adopted a series of 
resolutions in 1948, 1949, and 1952 calling for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces, a reduction of 
Indian armed forces in the state, and the appointment of a plebiscite Commissioner to oversee the 
holding of a plebiscite. The UN resolution adopted on 13 August 1948 recommended that a final 
decision on the status of Jammu and Kashmir ‘shall be determined in accordance with the will of 
the people’. Thus not only was a bilateral problem internationalised, a rider was once again 
attached to the act of accession - the holding of a plebiscite. This was followed by a call for a 
ceasefire in August 1948 as an essential step for the holding of the plebiscite. 
 
The ceasefire finally came into effect on 1 January 1949, and in July 1949 the military 
representatives of the two countries signed the Karachi Agreement which demarcated the 
ceasefire line. The ceasefire line stopped short at the Siachen Glacier [at map coordinate Point NJ 
9842]25 and formalised the tripartite division of the territory of J and K. India retained  less than 
half of undivided  J and K i.e.  a major part of Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley. One third 
                                                 
23 However they have never been formally accepted as a part of Pakistan, and as part of the Northern Territories 
along with Baltistan they remain under Pakistani administration without the same rights and privileges as the rest of 
the provinces in the country.  
24 The Government of India had insisted that it could not send troops otherwise. 
  
25 Since 1949 the ceasefire line has remained the de facto border between the two parts of Kashmir on the one hand 
and between India and Pakistan on the other. During the 1972 Simla negotiations between India and Pakistan, the 
ceasefire line was renamed the Line of Control [LOC]. The LOC stopped short at the Siachen glacier which extends 
for forty miles to the de facto border with China. In 1984 Indian troops took control of part of the glacier and now 
Indian and Pakistani troops confront each other in the highest war zone in the world. 
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of the region, which consists of a sliver of territory extending from the north to the south of 
western Jammu district, is under the control of Pakistan. Pakistan also controls Skardu in Ladakh, 
and the thinly populated Northern Territories of Gilghit and Baltistan.  Aksai Chin, constituting 
16.9 percent of the area of the state, came under the control of China during the 1950s. In 1963 
Pakistan ceded to China another 2.33 percent of the land claimed by India.26 
 
The promised plebiscite was never held, but J and K’s accession to the Indian Union was seen by 
India as settled for the following reasons. Firstly, the Maharaja had signed the Instrument of 
Accession. Secondly, although Sheikh Abdullah the leader of the National Conference (NC) 
party and the head of the state government since 1947, had vacillated on the issue of whether J 
and K should opt for independence or join India or Pakistan, declared at the Security Council in 
1948 that ‘Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the 
dominion of India’.27 Thirdly a few weeks after the Maharaja had acceded to India on 27 October 
1947, the working committee of the NC adopted a resolution recommending the accession of J 
and K to India. The resolution was ratified by a special convention of the representatives of the 
people of the state. Throughout the Indo-Pakistan war from October 1947 to December 1948, the 
NC supported India.28 Fourthly, the State Constituent Assembly which was convened in October 
1951 and to which delegates were elected on the basis of full adult franchise, approved accession 
and the Constitution of  J and K which was adopted in 1957 made the state an integral part of 
India. Fifthly, although the Security Council had recommended that Pakistan withdraw its troops 
from the territory as a condition for holding the plebiscite, this was not carried out. Nevertheless, 
the issue continues to be controversial and continues to overshadow politics in the valley. 
 
In Manipur, the circumstances in which the former princely state merged into India are equally 
contentious. Manipur stands out in the annals of Indian democracy, because the first democratic 
elections in the country were held in the state.29 A series of democratic movements since the late 
nineteenth century had opposed the monarchy and demanded democracy and representative 
government. On 12 December 1946 the Maharaja finally gave in to pressure and set up a 
committee to prepare a new constitution for the state. This was submitted to the Maharaja on 27 
June 1947. The Manipur State Constitution Act came into force in 1948. With the enforcement of 
the 1948 Manipur State Election Rules, Manipur became the first state in India to hold elections 
on the basis of universal adult franchise in June 1948. An elected assembly was sworn in on 
October 1948. The Praja Shanti Sabha party along with independent members formed a coalition 
government, and the younger brother of the Maharaja, Priya Brata Singh, was appointed by the 
Maharaja as Chief Minister in consultation with elected members.  
 
                                                 
26 Today 45.62 percent of the original territory of the state is with India, 35.15 percent with Pakistan, and 19.23 
percent with China. The valley of Kashmir consists of 15.8 percent of the area of Indian J and K, Jammu consists of 
25.9 percent, and Ladakh 58.3 percent. According to the 2001 census the population of Kashmir totals 10.01 million, 
of which Muslims form 64.2 percent, Hindus 32.2 percent, and others 3.6 percent. Muslims form 95 percent of the 
population in the valley.  
27 Cited in Riyaz Punjabi, 1995, 'Kashmir imbroglio: the socio-political roots', Contemporary South Asia, 4, 1, pp 
39-53, in pg 47. However, as Punjabi notes, Sheikh Abdullah declared in a public meeting in September 1947 that 
'Our first demand is complete transfer of power to the people in Kashmir. Representatives of the people in a 
democratic Kashmir will then decide whether the state should join India or Pakistan', ibid, pg 46.  
28 Vergehese Koithara, 2004,  Crafting Peace in Kashmir, Delhi, Sage, pg 55 
29 Technically Manipur was not at that time a part of India. 
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The Maharaja had signed the Instrument of Accession on 11 August 1947 according to which 
defence, external affairs, communications, custom, excise, and coinage were entrusted to the 
Government of India. The Government of India in turn assured the protection of the internal 
autonomy of Manipur without stipulating the future status of the state. A Standstill Agreement 
was signed on other matters. As the process to integrate princely states into the Union of India 
gained momentum, opinion was divided in Manipur  regarding the full merger of the state into 
the Indian Union.  One group, mainly consisting of the Manipuri branch of the Indian National 
Congress, pressed for full integration. A second group, consisting of Nagas from the hills, wanted 
to join Nagas across the border, who had proclaimed themselves independent on the eve of 15 
August 1947. But the third group, led by the Communist leader Irabot, resisted merger because 
he felt that this would endanger the political identity of the region.  
 
The Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, who visited Manipur to study the situation, became 
convinced that Irabot was planning a Communist coup. The Government of India  alarmed by the 
report, banned the Krishak Sabha, the Praja Sangha, the Mahila Sammelan, and the Students 
Federation. As attempts were made to arrest him, Irabot went underground and began to mobilise 
the peasants to launch a Telengana-like movement in the state and to establish an independent 
Peasant Republic of Manipur.30 Beset by fears that Manipur would renege on accession, the 
Indian Government decided to settle the issue through pressure. The Maharaja was invited to 
meet Sri Prakasha, the Governor of Assam, on 17 September 1949 in Shillong (because Manipur 
came under the jurisdiction of Assam) to discuss the differences between him and the Dewan 
appointed by the Central Government to oversee the affairs of the state. The Maharaja was 
reportedly confined to his residence until  he signed the merger agreement, despite his request 
that he should be allowed to consult his Council of Ministers before he did so.31 On 15 October 
1949 the Maharaja under duress signed the merger agreement thereby ceding  to the dominion 
government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation to, the 
government of the state. In return he was granted a privy purse of Rs 300,000. In effect, Manipur 
formally merged with the Indian Union without the act being ratified by the elected assembly. 
The Government of India dissolved the Prajashanti Sabha coalition ministry and the assembly, 
and appointed a Dewan-cum-Chief Commissioner from outside the state to administer the state. 
Even today the circumstances under which the Maharaja was made to sign the agreement are  
contentious. The elected representatives of the people were completely bypassed, the Maharaja 
was not allowed to consult the ministry, and the Government of India  in its haste to integrate the 
princely state into the Union trampled upon the democratic traditions of Manipuri people in the 
process. 
 
The case of Mizoram was different in that it voluntarily joined the Indian Union but on certain 
conditions. As an administrative unit, Mizoram pre-existed the formation of the Union of India, 
                                                 
30 He subsequently escaped to Myanmar where he set about organising a revolt against the merger, but he died in 
1951. 
 
31 Baruah writes that the Maharaja was virtually imprisoned in his residence in Shillong, the house was surrounded 
by soldiers and under the pressure of considerable misinformation, the Maharaja 'isolated from his advisors, council 
of ministers, and Manipuri public opinion' signed the merger agreement. When the ceremony which proclaimed an 
end to the ancient kingdom took place on 15 October 1949 in Imphal, the Indian army was in place to guard against 
possible trouble, Sanjib Baruah, 2005, Durable Disorders: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India, Delhi, 
Oxford University Press,  pg 60. 
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but it had a different status from the other two princely states. In 1935, the Mizo Hills were 
categorized as an ‘Excluded Area’ in the North East of India by the British government and were 
placed under the executive control of the Governor of Assam.32 No act of the Indian legislature or 
the Assam government could apply to the excluded areas, without the discretion of the Governor 
who was empowered to make regulations for the hills. Moreover since the territory fell within  
the ‘inside line’, it was isolated territory, with outsiders not being allowed to enter Mizoram.  
 
Traditionally Mizoram has been a pre-state society, mainly because the Lushais were a mobile 
community constantly in search of agricultural lands where they could practice shifting or jhoom 
cultivation. Every Mizo village was an independent unit claiming a certain portion of the territory 
for agricultural purposes. The British introduced two institutions which changed the shape of 
Mizo society: private property and hereditary chiefdom. This not only damaged political 
traditions of consultation and consensus, it led to the concentration of power in the institution of 
chiefdom.  
 
In addition, the British did not allow the Mizo people to engage in political activities. They could 
not establish political parties, nor could they directly participate in politics. Moreover Mizoram, 
which was a district of Assam, was not represented either in the Assam legislature or in the 
Central Legislative Council. Nevertheless, by the early decades of the twentieth century the Mizo 
youth rebelled against political censorship. Two factors facilitated political awareness among the 
Mizos. Firstly, Christian missionaries gave to them literacy,33 health care and a rallying point in 
the form of a common religion.34 Secondly, the educated and progressive middle class was 
exposed to the outside world during the two world wars, when Mizos served in the British armed 
forces. However, demands that Mizo Hills should be included under the Government of India 
Reform Act of 1919, that Mizos be represented in the provincial legislature of Assam after the 
Government of India Act of 1935, and that the Mizo youth should be allowed to form political 
organisations, hold political meetings, and be granted rights were ruthlessly suppressed. Despite 
these restrictions, the first political party - the Mizo Union - was established in 1936. 
 
It was only on the eve of India’s independence that the British began to encourage political 
activity, but efforts to bring the Mizo people into the political domain were accompanied by 
determined efforts to strengthen the power of the Chiefs. The Mizo Union (MU) challenged these 
plans. At its first General Assembly held in 1946, the MU decided to boycott the District 
Conference convened by the colonial administrative officer, because it was dominated by the 
Chiefs. The assembly also decided that the British District Officer be kept out of any exercise 
meant to decide the future constitutional status of Mizoram. 
 
The assembly debated three options that had been thrown up by the imminent independence of 
India: to declare independence, to join the Union of Burma, and to remain within India. 
Exhibiting great pragmatism the party refused the invitation of the leader of the Nagas, Phizo, to 
join the Naga movement and declare independence, even though Phizo committed that the Mizo 
                                                 
32 The Naga Hills and the area which is at present Arunachal Pradesh also had this status. 
33 Today Mizoram has the highest literacy rates in the country though the art of reading was introduced in the area 
only in 1894 
34 This is why the Mizos have not been prone to fragmentation and internal factionalism as have other tribes in 
Northeast India 
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language would become the lingua franca of the independent state of Mizo and Naga Hills. The 
second suggestion that Mizo Hills be joined with Myanmar was also dropped. The General 
Assembly decided that Mizo Hills should for the time being remain with India, subject to the 
condition that accession to the Union of India  be reviewed in ten years. 
  
In early 1947 the MU supported the position of the Chief Minister of Assam, Bordoloi, that 
Assam should not be grouped with Bengal. In return the Mizos asked for full representation in 
the Constituent Assembly and autonomy for Mizo Hills. The Bordoloi Sub-Committee for Assam 
and Partially Excluded Areas and Excluded Areas in the Constituent Assembly, invited two 
representatives of the MU to serve as co-opted members. On 22 April 1947, the MU submitted a 
proposal to H.M government, the interim government, and the Constituent Assembly through the 
sub-committee. The proposal stated that the Mizo people had the right of territorial unity, 
solidarity and self determination within the province of Assam in free India. Secondly Mizos 
should retain sole proprietory right over the land. Thirdly, the central government should extend 
special financial help until such time as the Mizos were able to maintain their territorial integrity 
and self-determination without financial aid. All the above items shall, stated the memorandum, 
be subject to revision according to the future trend of events even to the extent of seceding after 
ten years. The MU endorsed the Bordoloi Committee Report that Mizoram should be given 
autonomy within the province of Assam through the setting up of an Autonomous District 
Council. 
 
In short, the accession of the princely states of J and K and Manipur to the Indian Union was 
attended by great controversy. In J and K, not only was the promised plebiscite not held, the 
special status accorded to the state was progressively pared down, which in the process boosted 
discontent in the Valley. In Manipur, militants still resent the fact that their institutions were 
ignored and that the Maharaja was forced to sign the merger agreement and sections of Meitei 
youth have begun to question the legitimacy of the merger. In Mizoram, conditional integration 
into India was highlighted when armed insurrection broke out in the state in the mid 1960s. 
 
It is also important to note that democratic movements in all our four case studies had instilled 
tremendous political awareness in the people about their rights. In J and K in the 1930s even as a 
major movement under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference  (NC) 
party challenged the oppressive rule of the Dogra monarch, it also aimed at the eradication of 
extreme inequalities and oppression through major restructuring of land relations. Over time, the 
NC became democratic, egalitarian, secular and inclusive. In Manipur we have witnessed one of 
the most democratic and visionary movements in the country since the late nineteenth century. 
This was accompanied by the politicisation of women and the establishment of a radical tradition 
under the leadership of Irabot. In Mizoram, a political movement coalesced by the 1930s despite 
great odds and demanded the institutionalisation of democracy. In Punjab the Akali Dal (AD) had 
participated in the freedom struggle on the one hand and articulated the interests of the Sikh 
community on the other, since the 1920s. For these reasons, violations of the federal agreement 
generated extreme indignation among the highly politicised citizens of all four states.  
 
Violations of the Federal Principle  
 
The controversy over the process of accession into the Indian Union could still have been 
neutralised in the period that followed, if democracy and federalism had been given a chance to 
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work. That they were not allowed to work was cause enough for initial anger to soar. The reasons 
for the violation of the democratic/federal principle are complex, but basically after 1967 when 
the Congress lost power in half the state legislatures, and in the aftermath of the 1969 split in the 
Congress party, the leader of the party Prime Minister Indira Gandhi adopted a series of strategies 
which transformed the nature of federalism in the country. Being more than aware that effective 
power depended on control of the states, Ms Gandhi proceeded to dissolve the boundaries 
between the domain of state politics and central politics. The central government wilfully 
selected and dismissed Congress and non-Congress governments in state after state, imposed 
President’s rule arbitrarily and in general treated states as feudal fiefs. States consequently lost 
whatever autonomy they had been granted under the federal system. This not only led to popular 
dissatisfaction, it also de-legitimised state leaders who were seen as incapable of safeguarding 
regional autonomy. 
 
 In J and K if the issue of the never-held plebiscite constitutes the first axis of dissatisfaction in 
the state, the steady erosion of the special status of the state within the Indian federation 
constitutes the second. In May 1949 leaders of the central government and the NC agreed that the 
federal provisions of the Constitution would not apply to J and K and that the state would have its 
own constitution. The special status of J and K was codified in article 370 according to which 
Parliament could legislate for J and K in only three matters: external affairs, defence, and 
communications. Other provisions of the Indian Constitution could be extended to the state only 
with the prior concurrence of the state government and subject to ratification by the Constituent 
Assembly of the state. The first Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order issues 
in 1950 limited the application of Indian constitutional provisions to those mentioned in Article 
370.  
 
In October 1951, J and K elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for the state. In 
1952 the Delhi Agreement between the central government and the leaders of the NC stated that 
all powers other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession would remain with the state 
government. While the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution would apply to J 
and K, some provisions were modified to allow land reforms without compensation. Hereditary 
rule was abolished, all disputes between the centre and the state and between the state of J and K 
and other states were to be decided by the Supreme Court, and the jurisdiction of the election 
commission was limited to parliamentary, presidential and vice presidential elections. Whereas 
the provisions of article 352, which empowers the central government to declare an emergency 
and suspend normal government functioning in the states, applied to J and K in the case of 
external aggression, a declaration of an internal emergency would not apply to the state without 
the approval of the state government. Finally, J and K fell outside the ambit of articles 356 and 
360 which respectively empower the central government to impose President’s rule in the state 
and to impose financial emergency. 
 
However, within ten years the terms of the contractual agreement were completely violated by 
the central government. In 1953 Sheikh Abdullah was arrested because  despite his own earlier 
defence of accession to India in the Security Council, he had gone public on independence for J 
and K. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed took over as ‘Prime Minister’ of Kashmir for ten years. 
Under his rule the special status of J and K was steadily eroded. In 1957 the Constituent 
Assembly ceased to exist after having drafted a constitution for J and K which came into force on 
26 January 1957 and after having formalised accession to India on 15 February 1954. Now the 
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only barrier to the full integration of J and K into the Indian Union was the state government - a 
barrier which was removed by the compliant Prime Minister of J and K. In 1958 the special 
provisions governing the representation of the citizens of the state in the civil services were 
abolished and the state ceased to be financially autonomous. In 1959 and 1961 the permit system 
which regulated the entry of non-citizens into the state was done away with. The jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court and the Central Election Commission was extended to the state. In 1964, 
article 356 of the Indian Constitution was made applicable to J and K. A Delhi-appointed 
governor replaced the Sadar-i-Riyasat who had  formerly been appointed by the state legislative 
assembly. However, the governor of J and K continued to exercise the powers meant for the 
Sadar-i-Riyasat under article 92 of the J and K Constitution, without being responsible to the 
legislative assembly.  
The bitterness generated by the whittling away of the special status granted to J and K, was 
intensified by the repeated arrests of the charismatic leader Sheikh Abdullah who had begun to 
speak of an independent J and K. The desire of the central government to control the political 
affairs in J and K was motivated by one main fact: Pakistan continued to claim J and K on the 
grounds that the majority of the population was Muslim and alleged that the accession of the state 
to India was based on fraud. The ethnic factor has intensified the insecurity of the government of 
India  which has been habitually suspicious of any kind of political activity in the state. However,  
the activities of the regional party, the NC, also failed to breed confidence in the democratic 
process. Firstly the NC monopolised political power right up to 2002,35 often through massive 
electoral malpractices, thereby denying  space to other political formations. Secondly, the NC 
entered into often amoral alliances with the Congress party in order to retain its hold on power, a 
fact that led to enormous rancour. That political groups were forced to resort to extra-institutional 
means, particularly the use of violence to press their point is not entirely unexpected.36  
 
For example  in the 1983 elections, the turnout was around 70 percent but the electoral process 
was marked by widespread malpractices, which served to accelerate the destruction of an 
incompletely institutionalised democratic spirit. In July 1984, the new Governor of the state, 
Jagmohan dismissed the NC government headed by Farooq Abdullah on the charge that the party 
had lost a majority in the state. This followed the defection of 13 members of the government, of 
which 12 belonged to the NC.  Farooq was ordered to step down without a vote of confidence in 
the assembly. However, a new government under G.M Shah lasted only two years. In March 
1986 the central government withdrew its support to Shah and imposed Governor’s rule. But six 
months before the Governor’s rule was to end, the central government reinstalled Farooq 
Abdullah as the C.M. The re-establishment of cordial relations between the Congress and Farooq 
Abdullah generated tremendous distrust of both the NC and the Congress. This was exacerbated 
when the two parties, blithely ignoring earlier differences, allied to fight the 1987 elections.  
 
The turnout in the 1987 election was as high as 75 percent, the NC won in the valley and the 
Congress in Jammu, but communal organisations arrived on the scene with the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) securing two seats. Four among eight independents belonging to the Muslim United 
                                                 
35 The NC secured a majority in the 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, and 1977 elections. 
36 The findings of the research project: that the largest numbers of respondents in the Kashmir valley hold the state 
government and political parties more responsible thane central government  for the conflict makes sense in this 
context. 
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Front; a front of the Jamaat-e-Islami under the leadership of Ali Shah Geelani and several other 
Islamic groups, secured two seats in the legislature. The 1987 elections themselves were marked 
by coercion, electoral malpractices of a high order, and massive vote rigging. For instance the 
founder of the Peoples Conference in 1978, Abdul Ghani Lone, was declared as having lost the 
election, even though according to all reports he was winning. Subsequently Lone opted out of 
electoral politics. Bose suggests that electoral malpractices in the 1987 elections were the reason 
why Yusuf Shah – who belonged to the Jamaat-i-Islami which contested under the banner of the 
MUF - became Syed Salahuddin, the commander-in-chief of the dreaded Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, 
the largest guerrilla force fighting the Government of India in the valley. When Yusuf Shah 
protested, he was imprisoned along with Yassin Malik, his election officer. Yassin Malik upon 
his release subsequently joined the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front ( JKLF) as a core 
member,  having received training in arms in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).37 He now heads  
the JKLF, which demands independence for the state. Leaders who were denied a chance to 
participate in electoral democracy turned to militancy simply because the democratic system was 
corrupted by two parties determined to hold on to power. 
 
The controversial 1987 elections proved to be the flashpoint in the turn to armed struggle. 
Widmalm concludes that when democracy was functioning in a relatively peaceful way in J and 
K, the demand to change the political status of the region was neither heard nor supported.38 But 
after the 1987 elections, thousands of young men crossed the border to undergo training in 
Pakistan. In 1988 widespread protests and violence rocked the valley and President’s rule was 
imposed on the state. This provoked protests, demonstrations, large scale arrests and police 
firing. In February 1988 the state assembly was dissolved. By 1990 violence had escalated, and 
the scale of the uprising led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front took everyone including 
the JKLF by surprise. The army’s presence in the valley was reinforced with the extension of the 
Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the introduction of the Disturbed Areas Act. These Acts 
along with the J and K Public Safety Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities [Prevention] 
Act, which had been introduced in 1978 and 1987, completely paralysed life in the state. Whilst  
moderate leaders belonging to the JKLF were arrested, the Hizbul-ul-Mujahadeen a party  backed 
by Pakistan, came to play a dominant role in militant politics. By 1992 discontent in the valley 
had abated but in the meantime militants from outside the country had entered the valley and 
militancy rapidly assumed the form of a Low Intensity War which has not been controlled to 
date. 
 
In Punjab we see the same phenomenon. The Congress party which had commanded politics in 
Punjab from 1950 to 1966, and which had incorporated the AD in 1948-51 and 1956, thereby 
reducing  the latter to a mere lobby representing Sikh interests, could not come to terms with the 
fact that it lost the 1967 elections. From then on the Congress systematically worked to subvert 
the support base of the AD which came into power in the state in 1967 in alliance with other 
parties. The ministry lasted only eight months as some members defected and set up a minority 
government with the support of the Congress. However within nine months the Congress 
withdrew support and the government fell, resulting in the imposition of President’s rule. In the 
                                                 
37 Sumantra Bose, 2003, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict: Paths to Peace, Delhi, Vistaar Publications. 
, pg 48-50 
38 Sten Widmalm,  1998, ‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir’  in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli 
edited Community Conflicts And The State In India, Delhi, OUP, pp 149-182,in  pg 153-54. 
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1969 mid- term elections the AD once again came to power in coalition with the Jan Sangh. This 
government lasted until  1971, when factionalism once again led to the demise of the coalition, 
the fall of the government and the imposition of President’s rule in June 1971.   
In 1977, however, matters took a more serious turn when the Congress secured a mere  17 seats 
in the state legislative assembly. Alarmed at its declining electoral fortunes, the Congress 
leadership began to once again undercut the social base of the AD by cultivating the preacher 
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of the historic seminary the Damdami Taksal. 
Bhindranwale was a well-known and charismatic preacher, but he was also a dogmatic and 
intolerant religious reformer whose ambition was to purify the Sikh community, which in his 
estimation had strayed from the straight and narrow religious path. This was the man who was 
propped up by Congress leaders as an alternative centre of power. It was an act that the Congress 
had to pay for dearly, as Bhindranwale gathered a motley group of the discontented, the educated 
unemployed, small farmers who had not benefited from the Green Revolution, and above all 
members of the All India Sikh Students Federation, and set out to confront the Congress and the 
Akalis. As a result , the politics of fundamentalism and rabidly communal rhetoric came to 
dominate Punjab by the end of the 1970s. 
 
Violence became the order of the day with Bhindranwale’s followers targeting the Nirankari sect, 
seen as heterodox by orthodox Sikhs and Hindus.  Extremist organisations like the Dal Khalsa, 
Akhand Kirtani Jatha and the National Council of Khalistan began to raise slogans for Khalistan, 
though the Sant himself never demanded an independent state. In the process, Bhindranwale not 
only de-legitimised both the Akali and Congress leadership he also took politics to the street and 
ultimately towards the use of the gun.  
 
All this was to reverberate on the politics of the AD, which was forced to resort once again to the 
religious idiom and to the slogan of the ‘panth [religious community] in danger’ even though in 
the 1960s the AD had moved towards a secular idiom due to  the compulsions of coalitional 
politics. Confronted by an unresponsive central government on the one hand, and a rebellious 
group of Sikh youth under the leadership of Bhindranwale claiming that the AD was incapable of 
securing the interests of the community on the other, the Akalis intensified the struggle for the 
recasting of federal relations and raised the pitch of anti-centre rhetoric. From 1982 to 1984 the 
party initiated a number of campaigns, but the political initiative had passed into the hands of 
extremists. In the aftermath of the assault on  the Golden Temple by the Indian army, the 
secessionist movement gained popular support. It was only by 1992 that the security forces 
controlled the movement. What is of interest is the fact that violations of the federal/ democratic 
principle drove politics out of institutionalised channels and into the avenues provided by militant 
politics, which employed another kind of idiom - that of violence.  
 
In Manipur, state politics have followed the same path - defection leading to the fall of state 
governments, floor crossings, what in India is called ‘horse-trading’, non-cohesive coalitions, 
proliferation of parties, and the active interference of both the national parties, the Congress and 
the BJP, in the making and unmaking of governments. In 1972, the moment Manipur was granted 
statehood the Congress party began to meddle with the functioning of the regional party - the 
Manipur Peoples Party - which led the first coalition government. Engineered defections led to 
the collapse of the state government and the central government therefore imposed President’s 
Rule in the state.  Since that period, defections have stalked the political careers of governments 
in Manipur. Since 1972 Manipur has witnessed 18 changes of government. In the period 1995-
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2002 defections succeeded in demolishing four governments. In 2001 alone, two governments – 
the first led by Wahengbam Nipamacha and the second by Radhabinod Koijam - were dismissed 
within months and President’s rule was imposed on the state. 
 
In Mizoram the situation was far worse since it was complicated by massive neglect of Mizo 
interests. Initially, Mizoram was granted the status of an autonomous district within the state of 
Assam. Where the Mizo Union and the Assam Pradesh Congress, which ruled the government of 
Assam, had worked in tandem and represented the Mizo people both in the district council and in 
the Assam legislature, in time the relationship between the two parties became strained. Tensions 
were exacerbated when a major famine affected the area in 1959.39 The delay of the Assam 
Government in providing relief measures exacerbated tensions and a section of the Mizo Union 
formed the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) for organising relief work. In time the MNFF 
transformed itself into the Mizo National Front (MNF) which under the leadership of Laldenga 
was to launch an armed struggle for a sovereign state of Mizoram. At the same time, the MNF 
began to accuse the MU of not representing the interests of the Mizo people, and of being 
complicit  with the ruling Congress in Assam.  
 
As in the case of Punjab, militancy transformed the rhetoric and the practices of the governing 
party. In 1960 the leadership of the MU parted company with the Assam Congress over major 
issues such as  the mishandling of the famine, the language issue, and division of powers between 
the Assam government and the district council. One section of the leadership of the MU began to 
demand statehood and raised an unarmed volunteer force to launch a non-violent struggle for this  
purpose. The MNF participated in elections in order to capture power but also contacted the 
government of erstwhile East Pakistan for help and sanctuaries, recruited and trained volunteers  
and stockpiled arms. In 1965, the two parties came together to demand a Greater Mizoram, and 
the MNF gave up its secessionist demands. However, the Central government did not respond 
favourably. Consequently, the MNF which initiated an armed uprising on 1 March 1966, declared 
independence and overran the Mizo Hills. Even as the MU and other political formations kept up 
the pressure for statehood, the GOI in 1972 upgraded Mizoram to the status of a Union Territory. 
This was seen by some MU leaders as a transitional phase, but other leaders resigned from the 
party in protest at not being granted statehood.  
 
Politics in the state diverged from here on. The domain of electoral politics became a 
battleground between the national party (the Congress), the MU and other parties which emerged 
out of repeated splits in the MU. In 1972, after losing power in the legislative assembly, the 
Congress, under the direction of the party High Command, persuaded the MU to dissolve itself 
and to join the party, even though the Congress had been rejected by the electorate in the 
elections for practicing amoral politics and for fielding a large number of ex-rebels as candidates. 
By means of this coup d’etat the Congress  came to power in the legislative assembly with a 
massive mandate and in the process the leadership of the MU was completely discredited in the 
same way as the leadership of the NC had been discredited in J and K after the 1987 elections. 
 
In the meantime the war for the liberation of Bangladesh had resulted in the destruction of 
sanctuaries provided to the MNF in the Chittagong Hill Tracts by erstwhile East Pakistan. 
                                                 
39 The famine was known as  the Mautam famine and was caused by the destruction of crops by rats. This followed 
the flowering of the Mau bamboo tree.   
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Deprived also of a steady supply of arms and training facilities, the MNF fell into disarray and 
hundreds of its volunteers left to join electoral politics. By 1974, however, the MNF regrouped its 
depleted cadres and surfaced to launch a series of strikes from sanctuaries in Bangladesh and 
Myanmar. In January 1975, MNF cadres shot dead several high ranking police officers in a 
daring raid on a police station. This pushed the central government to gather its strength and its 
forces and launch an onslaught on the MNF. More importantly, central government officials set 
about overhauling the administration, engaging in confidence building measures to secure the 
loyalty of the citizens of Manipur, and educating the citizens about the issues involved in the 
militancy. They also embarked on a strategy of persuading the moderates in the armed movement 
to return to the mainstream of politics. The strategy succeeded spectacularly and mass surrenders 
once again depleted the cadres of the MNF which by 1975 found it extremely difficult to find 
support in the state for its violent struggle. Above all, the central government turned its attention 
to development issues to improve the lives of ordinary people. 
 
Meanwhile leaders of the MNF sent out feelers to the central government with a view to initiating 
talks for a resolution of the Mizo problem, but negotiations between Laldenga and the GOI 
proceeded in a series of fits and starts. After months of prolonged negotiations Laldenga signed a 
Peace Accord with New Delhi in 1978. However, he immediately retracted on his commitment 
and resumed militant operations. It was only in 1985 after a series of aborted negotiations, that 
Laldenga signed a Peace Accord with PM Rajeev Gandhi’s government. According to this  
agreement, the Congress ministry in Mizoram was dissolved and replaced by an interim coalition 
ministry consisting of the Congress and the MNF, which was headed by Laldenga. On 20 
February 1987 Mizoram was granted full statehood. This is the only case in India where 
insurgency has ended with the signing of a Peace Accord. Laldenga became the Chief Minister 
but when he lost office after two years, he did not return to militancy.  
 
Practices of Ethnic Mapping 
In three of our four cases, conflict has proved intractable because violations of the federal 
principle have intersected with another factor - the politicisation of identities in and through state 
policies of ethnic mapping. The precise point of reference implied by the phrase ‘ethnic mapping’ 
here is the way in which the GOI has tied collective entitlements to political goods, such as 
statehood or autonomous hill districts within the constituent states, to ethnic identity. The fact 
that designated groups such as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ have been granted access to economic 
opportunities has also served to propel mobilisation on the ethnic principle. In sum, the core 
principle of federalism in India - devolution of power to ethnic groups concentrated in a distinct 
territory - has bred great tension. When aligned to violations of the federal principle, the practices 
of ethnic mapping have led to the eruption of conflict. Conflict thus becomes an obdurate 
problem when the ethnic principle is superimposed onto  political grievances. 
 
The grant of special status to particular ethnic groups, let me hasten to add, is unquestionably 
normative and just. Even if the multicultural moment has peaked, we have learnt a great deal 
from theories that urge governments to adopt differential policies towards different groups.40 The 
leaders of the freedom struggle in India had recognised this in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, when linguistic states, protective discrimination, and minority rights were codified in the 
                                                 
40 I myself have written on the desirability of minority rights in my 1999 Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious 
Minorities, Delhi, Oxford University Press. 
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various documents drafted by the Indian National Congress. However, let me suggest, even at the 
risk of sounding politically incorrect, that the political consequences of what Baruah has termed 
the ‘protective discrimination regime’ in India have not always been positive.41  In many cases 
they have rebounded on the central government and often in violent ways. In other cases they 
have divided civil society even as groups rush to claim the collective entitlements that are due to 
them as a group. This may be a purely unintended consequence of ethnic plus territorial 
federalism. However, the activity we call politics is replete with instances of unintended 
consequences. This gives us reason to take another look at federal practices in the country. 
 
Firstly and undeniably, the connection of entitlements to collective goods - such as the grant of 
statehood and relatively autonomous political and administrative units - to group identity, 
reinforces the ethnic bond.  This in turn circumscribes the range of other political options such as 
class or citizenship. This is not to say that every member of every group thinks of herself or 
himself as belonging to one identity group out of the many that are available in a modern and 
complex society. But politics unfortunately is based on the silence of majorities, whereas 
leaderships that may well represent the minority in the group are articulate and forceful. 
Therefore, it is precisely this section that becomes politically significant. Secondly, group 
entitlements to collective goods: religious and cultural rights of minorities, protective 
discrimination for marginal groups, and grant of states or autonomous administrative units, not 
only results in the invention of identities and an eager rush to claim the particular status that will 
entitle the group to goods, but boosts competition between groups.  That  the state thus acquires a 
great deal of power as the arbiter of competitive ethnic politics is perhaps  predictable. Thirdly, as 
in all cases of competition, some groups win and others lose out in the process; it is not surprising 
that members of the latter category tend to interpret their losses in terms of generic discrimination 
against the group. Perceptions of discrimination on grounds of ethnic identity lend grist to the 
ethnic mill, which grinds both quickly and surely.  
 
I am not suggesting that identities are conjured out of nothing but that they are politicised 
because group identity is necessary in order to claim certain goods. For example,  let us consider 
the formation of linguistic states as constituent units of the federal system. Although the Indian 
National Congress became committed to the principle of linguistic states as early as the first 
decade of the twentieth century, its central leadership fearing further balkanisation of the country 
in the wake of  Partition on religious grounds,  hesitated and prevaricated on the issue after 
independence. This provoked  a series of protest movements,  beginning initially in Andhra 
Pradesh, which rapidly spilled over to the rest of the community.  Pandit Nehru was compelled to 
appoint a States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in 1953 to examine the issue of linguistic 
states.  After examining as many as 150,000 representations for or against linguistic states, the 
SRC decided in favour of the formation of such states 
 
Four issues emerge as particularly relevant for our discussion in this context. Firstly, unlike the 
USA,  in India the constituent units of the federation were created by the central government, 
which has the power to create new states out of existing ones. The Union of India is 
indestructible, but the constituent states are not. Secondly, the central government exercised a 
great deal of power and discretion in deciding  which of the competing language groups in the 
first round and ethnic groups in the second and third rounds of state formation were to be given 
                                                 
41 Sanjib Baruah, op cit, pg 193. 
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their own state. Thirdly, the grant of statehood as a collective entitlement to linguistic and ethnic 
groups, in the successive rounds of state formation, led to the reification of ethnic identities, 
although this led to some groups rushing to ask for a state of their own, while other groups in the 
same region resisted this demand. Fourthly, the grant of statehood to some groups and the denial 
of statehood to other groups bred resentment in the latter, who alleged that their language, culture 
and identity had been devalued. 
 
Consider the case of Punjab, the Akali Dal claimed a Punjabi Suba from the SRC on the basis of 
the Punjabi language.42 But matters were complicated by the fact that under the influence of 
communal Hindu organisations, Punjabi-speaking Hindus in the state discarded their own 
language and declared Hindi as their mother tongue in the 1951 and the 1961 census. The idea 
was to establish that Punjab was bilingual and that Punjabi is a mere dialect of Hindi.43 The SRC 
rejected the demand for a Punjabi Suba on the grounds that Punjab was bilingual and that a 
majority of the people were opposed to the formation of a Punjabi Suba. Pandit Nehru, already 
shaken by the Partition, and fearful of further partitions on the grounds of religion, dismissed the 
demand as communal and divisive, as did the Congress Chief Minister of Punjab Kairon. 
 
The rejection of the Punjabi Suba by the SRC generated great acrimony because in 1946 the AD 
had demanded an independent state of Sikhistan. It was a demand that was neither made nor 
taken seriously because it was clearly meant to counteract the 1940 Pakistan resolution, and 
because the Sikhs were not geographically concentrated in undivided Punjab. Nor did they form a 
majority in the region. But Pandit Nehru promised that in a post-independence India, the Sikh 
community, which had  participated massively in the freedom movement, would be assured of a 
‘favoured status’ where it could experience the ‘glow of freedom’. Holding aloft this 
commitment, the Akalis demanded a Punjabi Suba in the Constituent Assembly.44 The demand 
was rejected and the representatives refused to sign the Constitution. Further rejection by the 
SRC led to heightened politicisation among the Akalis, who articulated a sense of hurt that 
Punjabi had been denied its rightful status. For instance on the 15 August 1961, when the AD 
leader Master Tara Singh undertook a ‘fast unto death’ for a Punjabi Suba he was to state that: 
 
A national principle has been adopted that to make the people feel the glow of 
freedom, states should be created on the contiguity of language affording full 
scope for the development of one’s language in the state. Whereas this principle 
had been implemented in other parts of India in Punjab the area, which even the 
government experts feel is a Punjabi speaking area, is not being afforded the status 
of a state, simply because the Hindus do not agree to it.45 
 Whilst the  Akalis launched a massive non-violent struggle to be recognised as a staatsvolk in 
1955, the Hindus initiated the ‘Save Hindi’ agitation in 1957-58. In the main, Punjabi Hindus 
                                                 
42 The party suggested that Punjabi-speaking areas in existing Punjab, PEPSU, and Rajasthan be amalgamated to 
constitute a new Punjab and that Hindi speaking areas of Punjab and PEPSU should be merged into the neighbouring 
Hindi speaking regions.  
43 However, in the 1971 census only half of the Hindu community recorded its language as Hindi. 
44 After Partition, though the Sikhs were in a minority of 35% of the population compared to 62%  Hindus, they were 
concentrated in the central districts of Punjab. This encouraged the Akali leadership to demand the special status that 
the community had been promised before partition.  
 
45 K. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Delhi Penguin, vol 2, pg 300.  
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feared that the AD  which is closely tied to the religious organisation that controls gurudwaras  - 
the Shrimoni Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee - was exclusive, communal and oriented 
towards the establishment of a Sikh state. By the time the second campaign for a Punjabi Suba 
was launched in 1962, under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh, the AD had read the writing on 
the wall. The demand for a Suba was now couched in more inclusive terms of culture and 
language and not that of religion. By 1965 the situation had altered. PM Nehru and Pratap Singh 
Kairon who had opposed the formation of the Suba were no more and by the mid 1960s a 
movement for the formation of a Hindi speaking state of Haryana in the South East of Punjab 
modified the thrust of the Hindu/Hindi movement within the state. After the end of the 1965 
Indo-Pakistan war, a Parliamentary Committee set up to look into the issue recommended the 
creation of the linguistic state of Punjab. On 1 November 1966 the Punjab Re-organisation Act 
came into effect with the state being once again divided into Punjab and Haryana, with some of 
the mountainous areas going to the new state of Himachal Pradesh. By now the Sikhs constituted 
almost 60 percent of the population of Punjab and dreams of a Sikh majority state were finally 
realised. 
 
The division of the state, however, left major issues unresolved: the non-transfer of Chandigarh 
which was constructed as the proposed capital of Punjab, but which after 1966 became a Union 
Territory and the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana; and the exclusion of many Punjabi 
speaking areas from the new state. The delay in the grant of a ‘state of one’s own’ and an 
incomplete agenda loomed large over politics in Punjab, with the sanctity of the Indian state 
being challenged in the space of barely  fifteen years. 
 
If the suggestion that the grant of collective entitlements to identity groups serves to harden the 
hold of identity on the collective imagination of the group, and breeds resentment if the said 
group is not granted entitlements  approved for others, proves valid for Punjab, then the case of 
Manipur provides further proof. Manipur became a Part C state in 195046 and was granted the 
status of a Union Territory ruled directly by the central government in 1956, after the SRC did 
not accept its claim for statehood. It was only in 1972 that Manipur was granted the status of a 
fully fledged state, 23 years after the merger and later than Meghalaya and Nagaland. As in the 
case of Punjab, this generated tremendous bitterness for historical reasons. The Manipuris  had 
established a sophisticated kingdom at a time when state formation was unknown to most parts of 
the region. The ancient chronicle of the Meiteis, the Cheitharol, lists 74 Meitei kingdoms going 
back in time to 33 A.D. Not only have the Meiteis possessed a distinct political and territorial 
status for centuries, they can also legitimately boast of a highly literate and developed culture, an 
advanced literary tradition which stretches back a thousand years, and a distinctive linguistic 
tradition. However,  the Manipuri language – Meiteilon - was included in the Eighth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitution as one of the recognised languages of the country only in 1992, although 
the National Sahitya Academy had recognized Manipuri as a modern advanced language. This 
led to the perception that the Meitei culture had been discriminated against. The denial of 
statehood to Manipur and the dismissal of its culture has been seen as arbitrary and as 
discriminatory and this has fed into the rhetoric of grievances and secessionism against the 
central government. 
 
                                                 
46 Part B and C states categorised erstwhile princely states 
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Matters have been made  more complex due to the fact that the  the Meiteis reside in the Imphal 
valley.  The 29 hill tribes have been granted the status of Scheduled Tribes (ST) under the Fifth 
and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and have accordingly been granted reservations in 
educational institutions and in public jobs, and preferential treatment in the grant of various 
licences. This has resulted in an over-representation of the hill tribes in the civil services and in 
the state government, creating resentment  among the Meiteis, since unemployment is high in the 
Imphal valley and the government is seen as the main provider of jobs. Moreover,  whereas the 
valley people cannot buy land in the hills, the converse does not hold true. Thus while the Imphal 
valley forms only 10 percent of the land area of the state, it supports almost 72 percent of the 
population and the population continues to expand because of migration. This has stretched 
resources and exacerbated unemployment with the result that groups of Meiteis who felt that they 
had received neither the privileges which accrue to Hindus in the rest of the country, nor the 
benefits which are attached to ST status, proceeded to mobilise for two incompatible goals. Some 
Meitei groups demanded the status of ‘Other Backward Castes’(OBC) and the collective benefits 
attached to this category, notably reservations. This status has now been granted to them. Other 
sections of Meitei youth demand independence and renounce their Hindu identity. In the process, 
a major revivalist movement to recover a pre-Hindu identity, the old Sanamahi religion, the 
traditional vocabularies of the Meitei people, and above all the status of an independent state has 
erupted in the valley. Whilst the grant of OBC status would lead to the integration of the Meitei 
youth into the country, revivalism is leading them to insurgency and secessionism. This is the 
paradox of Manipur. 
 
Manipur is today one of the most troubled states in India, wracked by inter-ethnic strife, 
militarisation of ethnic groups in the pursuit of different causes, and secessionism. The situation 
is complex because the state is crisscrossed by competing claims and clashing projects. On the 
one hand, sections of Meitei youth demand secession from India, whilst the Nagas demand either 
an ethnic homeland which would include Nagas across the borders of Manipur (Nagalim), or the 
status of an autonomous hill district within Manipur under the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution.47 The Meiteis resent both Naga  demands.  Matters are further complicated, since 
whereas the Zemi Nagas, the Lianmai Nagas, and the Rangmai Nagas want a Zeliangrong state or 
an autonomous district under  the provisions of the Sixth Schedule, the Kuki tribes demand a 
Kukiland within the Indian Constitution, and a SADAR (Selected Area Development and 
Administrative Region) district. Not only do the Meiteis resist this demand, the Nagas do so as 
well. The Kukis have formed a Kuki Independence Army to protect themselves against the 
Nagas,48 the Nagas have joined one of the two major armed groups of Nagas across the borders 
of Manipur, and the Meiteis have organised into four rival armed groups. Not only does Manipur 
have the highest number of private militias in the country but inter-ethic clashes, which were not 
a general feature of Manipuri politics in earlier decades, have become common since the 1980s, 
making the state one of the most troubled  in the region. 
 
In J and K, the politicisation of ethnicity is indisputably a structural feature of politics in the state. 
The ethnic dimension of the Kashmir problem needs more elaboration than is possible here. 
Briefly, even though the NC eventually professed secularism, it was from the beginning steeped 
                                                 
47 The Sixth Schedule which provides for autonomous districts and areas within states is applicable only to the 
Northeast. 
48 The ultimate objective is to attain an independent Kukiland in Northern Myanmar dominated by the Kuki tribe. 
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in Muslim mores and a shared Muslim identity, mainly because it articulated the grievances of a 
highly oppressed Muslim peasantry, and because it challenged the power of a Hindu Dogra ruler. 
As with the case of Punjab, this  has drawn a sharp  response from other groups in the state and 
now sections of the Hindu community in Jammu have mobilised under communal organisations 
to resist Muslim domination of the state. Moreover, whereas India sees the integration of a 
Muslim dominated state as validation of its policy of secularism, Pakistan sees the non-accession 
of the state as part of the unfinished business of the Partition. Politics has been once again 
submerged into the religious idiom. This has lent  politics a distinctly religious cast in the valley. 
Furthermore, communal Hindu organisations in India, notably the RSS and its parliamentary 
wing the BJP, allege that special status has been allotted to J and K because the majority of the 
population is Muslim. Accusing the Congress of practising what they call ‘pseudo-secularism’, 
Hindu communal organisations demand the abolition of article 370. In short, even though the 
popular uprising in the valley was prompted by the fact that democracy was simply not given a 
chance to work there and by the fact that repeated violations of the federal principle  truncated 
regional autonomy, the secular origins of the uprising have been completely obfuscated. This 
carries serious consequences since overuse of the religious idiom has facilitated the entry of 
armed groups who now fight in the cause of Jehad.  
 
Implications of the Argument 
I have suggested above that none of the factors identified by our respondents as responsible for 
the outbreak of conflict - corruption, basic needs, and neglect of identity (re political institutions) 
- stand alone. They intertwine in complex ways to lend to discontent a militant and a secessionist 
edge. Inability to meet basic needs is a cause for disaffection but whether it leads to militancy is 
doubtful. Punjab agriculture is in a state of decline, the state has a fragile industrial base, and both 
these factors have exacerbated unemployment. But Punjab ranks third in the hierarchy of Indian 
states in terms of per capita income. J and K suffers from unproductive land holdings, a weak 
industrial base, and unemployment, as do Mizoram and Manipur, but poverty figures in J and K 
are much below other states. Mizoram and Manipur rank much higher than other states in social 
development indicators such as infant and maternal mortality rates. Only Kerala has higher 
literacy levels than Mizoram, whilst  Manipur is second to only Kerala when it comes to gender 
equity. 
In Mizoram we can trace a connection between neglect of basic needs by the state and subsequent 
armed insurrection. Originally discontent arose when the Assam government showed complete 
indifference when a major famine struck the Mizos. The Mizo leadership, convinced that the 
future of the people could only be guaranteed when they were given a state of their own, began to 
mobilize for statehood within the Indian Union. What they got was the status of a Union 
Territory (administered directly by the Central Government) in 1972 after prolonged 
negotiations. In the meantim, another political group, the MNF, launched an armed struggle for 
independence under the leadership of Laldenga. It was only in 1985, after a series of protracted 
and often abortive negotiations with Laldenga, that the insurrection was controlled and Laldenga 
gave up violence. This is the only case in India where a Peace Accord has led to the cessation of 
violence and where the movement was not reinvented. In part this is because the Central 
Government adopted a massive strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in Mizoram and launching 
development initiatives for the betterment of society. In part it is due to the fact that the Indian 
Government was willing to recognise an insurgent leader as the representative of the people. The 
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Mizo case shows clearly that when the Central Government sincerely sets out to tackle the 
structural causes of the insurgency, conditions become favourable for cessation of violence. But 
the Mizo situation also proved amenable to resolution because of the absence of the ethnic factor. 
In the other  three states, though neglect of basic needs is a given, conflict has been caused in and 
through a combination of two factors: violation of the federal and democratic principle, and 
practices of ethnic mapping. In Punjab the SRC dismissed the claims of the Akalis for a Punjabi 
Suba when other linguistic groups were given states of their own. This was cause enough to 
propel mobilisation. But after the linguistic state of Punjab had been conceded, repeated 
infringement of regional autonomy by the Congress party (then in power at the Centre), the fact 
that the Akalis had to temper their own agenda to meet the necessities of coalitional politics, and 
the fact that Chandigarh was not transferred to the state, gave rise to a third set of agents - the 
militants under Bhindranwale.   Ironically enough, they had been propped up by the Congress 
party to counteract the Akalis. Even as the Akalis intensified the tone of anti-centre rhetoric, the 
militants took over the politics of the state through a series of violent acts. The army assault on 
the Golden Temple brought popular support to the militants for almost eight years. The 
movement failed for a number of reasons: lack of ideological cohesiveness; personalized enmities 
among the militants which led to a splintering of the movements, the shallow support base of the 
Khalistan movement in society; and the fact that the Sikh trading and industrial class is firmly 
integrated into the Indian market. However, this does not cancel out the fact that the non-grant of 
the state of Punjab in the first instance and the repeated violations of the federal/democratic 
principle in the second instance produced major violence in one of the most prosperous states of 
the Indian Union. 
The case of J and K tells us that ‘bad faith’ creates and sustains discontent. The issue of holding a 
referendum in J and K on the accession may have been sidelined by now, but it has not ceased to 
draw forth ire. The fact that the special status, accorded to the state after it acceded to India, was 
systematically eroded within a space of a decade added to discontent. Furthermore, if in J and K 
the federal principle of regional autonomy has been repeatedly violated by competitive party 
politics, it should be noted that the regional party (the NC) closed off the democratic and electoral 
space to other political groups. It is worthwhile considering that if the participation of these 
groups in the electoral process had been encouraged, we may have seen the normalisation of 
politics in the state. But since this was not so, political groups were compelled to function in an 
extra-institutional political space and were forced to resort to the religious idiom to mobilise the 
population. As in Punjab, both state and the national parties were completely discredited in J and 
K, and a third set of leaders emerged to lend violent overtones to the political processes. The 
frustration of the people of the Kashmir valley with the electoral process was more than evident 
in the series of popular demonstrations that overwhelmed the valley in 1989. Within  four years 
popular mobilisation ebbed but in the meantime  it was  replaced by militants from outside the 
valley fighting for a different cause altogether and not that of independence for  J and K. 
In Manipur, ethnic conflict has proved intractable for the following reasons. Firstly, the Maharaja 
was compelled to sign the merger agreement with India and democratic institutions, which the 
state had justifiable reason to be proud of, were completely sidelined. Secondly, the Manipuri 
people with a long history of sophisticated state-making were not granted a state of their own 
until  1972. The resentment this generated, along with their resentment that the Manipuri 
language was not initially included in the Eighth Schedule led to discontent. Thirdly, the fact that 
hill tribes were granted collective entitlement to certain goods bred resentment. To put it bluntly, 
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the Meiteis  feel that they and their rich culture have been discriminated against.  Fourthly, even 
as some sections of the Meiteis began to employ violence in order to press their demand for 
secession from India, hill tribes have employed violence to press for other demands. This has 
created inter-ethnic tensions of gigantic proportions and control over the many insurgencies in 
Manipur seems problematic. In the four Manipur cases studied for this project, we found identity 
wars firstly to be about neglect of identity by the central government and secondly to be about 
resentment against the mobilisation of identity by other groups. In short, one cannot  present 
federalism as an answer to problems of conflict without reference to the context in which federal 
institutions play out their roles. When federalism is based on territory as well as on ethnic 
identities, the grant of statehood to some groups can work  both ways. It can both resolve 
tensions and generate tensions. Ironically, Pandit Nehru accepted the formation of linguistic 
states in order to quieten the discontent which had erupted over the issue in South India, 
particularly in Andhra Pradesh.  However, in Punjab, Manipur and Mizoram the denial of 
statehood accelerated discontent so that even though all three states were subsequently granted 
statehood, resentment that other groups were given  a state of their own earlier than Punjab, 
Manipur and Mizoram, imprinted on the collective memory of the group in question. It was 
precisely this resentment that was tapped by militant leaders when they set out to confront the 
Indian state. 
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